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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ronald Favini appeals from the district court's Sentencing Disposition and Notice 
of Right to Appeal. Mr. Favini asserts that the district court violated his Fifth 
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination when the district court used 
information contained in a competency evaluation against him during his jurisdictional 
review hearing, requiring his sentence to be vacated and a new review hearing ordered. 
Alternatively, Mr. Favini asserts that his ultimately-imposed unified sentence of fifty 
years, with five years fixed, stemming from a jury finding him guilty of aggravated 
battery and the district court finding him to be a persistent violator, was excessive in 
light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Mr. Favini committed the crime 
of aggravated battery. (R., pp.7-8.) Mr. Favini waived his right to a preliminary hearing, 
was bound over into the district court, and an Information was filed charging him with 
the above-crime. (R., pp.30-34.) In addition, Part II of the Information alleged that 
Mr. Favini used a deadly weapon while committing the aggravated battery, and Part Ill 
of the Information alleged that Mr. Favini was a persistent violator of the law. 
(R., pp.33-34.) Mr. Favini was found guilty by a jury of having committed the 
aggravated battery (and, based upon the jury instructions, of having used a deadly 
weapon during the commission of that crime) and the district court found that Mr. Favini 
1 
had at least two prior felony convictions making him a persistent violator. (R., pp.115, 
119, 133-134; Tr., p.261, L.1-p.274, L.1.) 1 
At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for Mr. Favini requested that a mental 
health evaluation be prepared pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2524, and the district court 
granted that request. (R., p.135; Tr., p.275, L.3 - p.277, L.20.) Later, but still prior to 
sentencing, counsel for Mr. Favini requested that a competency evaluation be 
conducted pursuant to 1.C. § 18-211, an evaluation was conducted, and Mr. Favini was 
deemed legally competent. (R., pp.138-142; Exriibits, pp.79-83.)2 During the 
sentencing hearing, the State asked the court to impose a unified sentence of thirty 
years, with ten years fixed, while counsel for Mr. Favini requested that the court retain 
jurisdiction. (Tr. p.293, Ls.3-7, p.297, Ls.13-19.) The district court imposed a unified 
sentence of fifty years, with fifteen years fixed, and retained jurisdiction for 365 days. 
(R., pp.146-151; Tr. p.304, L.18 - p.305, L.11.) Mr. Favini filed a timely Notice of 
Appeal. (Augment: Notice of Appeal)3 
After approximately seven months of programming, the Department of 
Correction recommended that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. (Augmentation: 
Addendum to the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSl).)4 During the 
1 Two sets of transcripts were created for this appeal. The transcript containing the jury 
trial and sentencing hearing will be referred to as "Tr." while the transcript containing the 
jurisdictional review hearing will be referred to as 'Tr. Supp." herein. 
2 The Presentence Investigation Report and related documents, the I.C. § 19-2524 
Evaluation, the I.C. § 18-211 Evaluation, and trial exhibits are all contained in the 
electronic file "39123 State v. Favini Exhibits." Citations to these documents will contain 
the heading "Exhibits" and the page number(s) associated with the electronic file. 
3 Mr. Favini has filed a motion to augment the record with a copy of the Notice of Appeal 
filed in this case. The motion to augment the record is currently pending. 
4 This Court granted Mr. Favini's motion to augment the record with the Addendum to 
the Presentence Investigation Report dated April 13, 2012, as well as other pertinent 
documents. See Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule, dated June 5, 2012. 
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jurisdictional review hearing, the State recommended that the district court relinquish 
jurisdiction and reduce Mr. Favini's sentence to a unified term of twenty-five years, with 
five years fixed, while counsel for IVlr. Favini asked the court to continue retaining 
jurisdiction so that Mr. Favini could continue to work towards rehabilitation with an 
emphasis on his mental health condition, and echoed the prosecutor's request for a 
reduced sentence. (Tr. Supp., p.10, L.23 - p.15, L.1.) In explaining its reasoning, the 
district court stated that it did not have any evidence of a mental health condition that 
"causes [Mr. Favini] to have that antisocial behavior," and the court specifically cited to 
the conclusions reached in the I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation. (Tr. Supp., p.15, 
L.2 - p.18. L.24.) The district court ultimately relinquished jurisdiction but reduced 
Mr. F avini's sentence to a unified term of fifty years, with five years fixed. 
(Augmentation: Retained Jurisdiction Disposition and Notice of Right to Appeal;5 
Tr. Supp., p.15, Ls.2-12.) 
5 See fn. 3, above. 
3 
ISSUES 
1. Did the district court violate Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination when it improperly used information obtained for purposes of 
determining Mr. Favini's competency, during the jurisdictional review hearing? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence in 




The District Court Violated Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination When It Improperly Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of 
Determining Mr. Favini's Competency, During The Jurisdictional Review Hearing 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Favini asserts that the district court improperly considered the conclusions 
contained within his competency evaluation, which were based in part on statements 
that he made during the competency evaluation, as an aggravating circumstance when 
determining Mr. Favini's sentence during the jurisdictional review hearing. 
B. The District Court Violated Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination When It Improperly Used Information Obtained For Purposes Of 
Determining Mr. Favini's Competency, During The Jurisdictional Review Hearing 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that "No 
person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 
This safeguard against compelled self-incrimination applies to both the guilt and penalty 
phases of a trial. Mitchell v. United States, 562 U.S. 314, 325-27 (1999); Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63 (1981); Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 563-64 (2006); 
State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 871-72 (1989). A competency evaluation ordinarily 
does not implicate the Fifth Amendment because any disclosures made by the 
defendant are not used against him but are used only for the limited purpose of 
determining whether he is competent to proceed. See Estelle, 451 U.S. at 465. Fifth 
Amendment rights come into play, however, if disclosures made during a competency 
evaluation or conclusions derived from such disclosures, are later used against the 
defendant either during the guilt phase or to determine the appropriate sentence. Id. 
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Thus, generally speaking neither statements made by an accused during a competency 
evaluation, nor psychiatric opinions derived therefore, may be admitted against a 
defendant for sentencing purposes, unless the defendant was advised of the right 
against self-incrimination and waived that right. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469; State v. 
Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817, 820 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Mr. Favini acknowledges that he did not raise these concerns to the district court 
during the jurisdictional review hearing, although it does not appear that he had any 
forewarning from the district court that the court would use his competency evaluation 
against him, as the court had not mentioned that evaluation during his original 
sentencing hearing, and made reference to the report only after the court had actually 
pronounced its sentence. (Tr. Supp., p.15, L.2 - p.18, L.24; See also Tr., p.286, L.1 -
p.308, L.13.) Nevertheless, Mr. Favini's claim may still be addressed pursuant to 
Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. Where a defendant seeks to raise an issue on 
appeal not preserved in the district court: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). 
In the present case, Mr. Favini meets the Perry fundamental error standard. 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Favini participated in both an I.C. § 19-2524 mental health 
evaluation, and an I.C. § 18-211 competency evaluation. (Exhibits, pp.71-83.) 
Dr. Parkman was the author of the 18-211 evaluation and relied, at least in part, upon 
statements made by Mr. Favini in ultimately reaching her conclusion that Mr. Favini was 
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competent to proceed. (Exhibits, pp.79-83.)6 Within two months of arriving at North 
Idaho Correctional Institution, Mr. Favini's case manager requested the assistance of a 
mental health clinician to determine whether the Therapeutic Community program was 
appropriate for him. (Augmenation: APSI, p.3.) Mr. Favini met with a mental health 
counsel '"on several different occasions during his incarceration at NICI."' Id. It was 
clear that Mr. Favini "displayed some inappropriate and disconcerting behavior patterns" 
including telling a program facilitator a story about how "he and his girlfriend were 
guinea pigs and that they were injected with dyes that would make their skin glow and 
that he would be given different drugs and that he would wake up reading 'it' on a crack 
pipe." Id. 
However, after pronouncing its sentence, the district court stated, "I'm not seeing 
anything now that would indicate that your mental concerns are anything - any more 
legitimate than the concerns that you and your attorney argued at the time of 
sentencing, and I'll talk more about that here in a minute." (Tr. Supp., p.15, L.2 - p.16, 
L.2.) The district court went on to discuss its view of Mr. Favini's mental health 
condition and the court's own feeling that it does not contribute to Mr. Favini's "antisocial 
behavior," and further stated the following: 
You have been given several mental health evaluations, and none 
of them show any mental illness that would explain your conduct. We 
have a report from Amanda Wilson, a mental health screening evaluation, 
the diagnosis of malingering and an antisocial personality disorder, in 
addition to your alcohol dependence and your cocaine dependence and 
your amphetamine dependence, and that was regarding her evaluation of 
you April 26, 2011. A couple of months later, June 13th , 2011, 
Dr. Parkman, a psychologist, diagnosed you essentially similarly 
with personality disorder, not otherwise specified, with marked 
borderline, schizotypal and antisocial features in addition to your 
6 For example, Dr. Parkman noted "Although Ron engaged in colorful reminiscing about 
his drug experiences in this examination and some obvious evasions, he did not appear 
to be attempting to malinger." (Exhibits, p.81.) 
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poly-substance dependence, generalized anxiety disorder, mood 
disorder, and then - I think that was the extent of the mental health 
evaluations. 
(Tr. Supp., p.18, Ls.1-15 (emphasis added).) 
It is abundantly clear that the district court used the conclusions reached by 
Dr. Parkman in the 18-211 evaluation against Mr. Favini during the jurisdictional review 
hearing, wherein the court was to determine the appropriate sentence. Dr. Parkman's 
conclusions were derived, at least in part, from statements that Mr. Favini made to 
Dr. Parkman. Therefore, Mr. Favini's Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-
incrimination was violated by the district court. This Constitutional right was not waived 
by Mr. Favini and, in fact, his statements were made with the promise that they would 
not be used against him. See I.C. § 18-215. Nothing in the record supports a finding 
that defense counsel's failure to object was a strategic decision especially considering 
the fact that the district court did not mention Dr. Parkman's conclusions until after the 
district court had pronounced its sentence. Finally, it is clear that the district court used 
the 18-211 evaluation in aggravation of Mr. Favini's sentence finding that his mental 
health issues did not explain his behavior. Mr. Favini asserts that he has met his 
burden of proving fundamental error in the district court's use of the § 18-211 evaluation 
against him. 
Mr. Favini further asserts that his case should be remanded for a new sentencing 
hearing in front of a new district court judge, with instructions that the court not use the 
information contained in the § 18-211 evaluation against Mr. Favini. CJ. Jockumsen, 
148 Idaho at 822-823, Estrada 143 Idaho at 563-65 (2006). 
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II. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In Light Of 
The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Favini was convicted of cutting the hand of another individual, in the web 
between the thumb and forefinger, with a small pocket knife, leaving a one inch scar. 
(Exhibit, pp.2-3.) He asserts that his unified sentence of fifty years, with five years fixed, 
is excessive in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In 
Light Of The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case 
Mr. Favini asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of fifty 
years, with five years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the 
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will 
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the 
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See 
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Favini does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Favini must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was 
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 
141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)). 
The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of 
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society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. 
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136 
Idaho 138 (2001) ). 
Ronald Favini is mentally ill. 7 When he was fourteen years old, he got into a car 
accident resulting in head trauma. (Exhibits, p.14.) In addition to the erratic behavior 
observed by NICI staff noted above, Mr. Favini has long history of treatment from 
mental health providers in both Washington and Idaho. (Exhibits, pp.14-15, 23-55.) He 
has received a smorgasbord of diagnoses in the past including, Delusional Disorder, 
Bipolar Disorder, Mood Disorder, Schizoaffective Disorder, Paranoid Psychosis, and 
Seizure Disorder, as well as a long, documented history of drug abuse which likely 
plays some role in his mental health. Id. In 2007, Mr. Favini was involuntarily 
committed by the State of Washington for 90 days of mental health treatment. (Exhibits, 
pp.35-38.) In addition to noting his long history of mental illness, the PSI writer noted 
that Mr. Favini's mental status began to erode about 2/3rds of the way through the very 
interview the writer conducted with Mr. Favini in preparation for that report. (Exhibits, 
p.18.) Mr. Favini expressed a desire for continued mental health treatment. (Exhibits, 
p.14.) 
Mr. Favini's mental health and the prescription drugs he had consumed to treat 
his conditions, in combination with the large amount of alcohol that he consumed, no 
7 Despite a mountain of evidence to the contrary, the licensed clinical social worker who 
conducted the I.C. § 19-2524 mental health evaluation concluded that Mr. Favini was 
malingering and does not have any mental illness under Idaho law, based upon his 
performance on the M-FAST (the sole test administered) and his clinical interview, 
which began with Mr. Favini questioning the licensed clinical social worker's 
qualifications to conduct such an evaluation. (Exhibits, pp.72-78.) 
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doubt played a major role his actions that led to his conviction. (Exhibits, pp.2-4.) The 
victim himself, Jeremy George, acknowledged that he too was intoxicated on the night 
of their scuffle, that he held no ill will towards Mr. Favini, and that Mr. Favini should be 
punished only '"in some way."' (Exhibits, pp.2-3.) Mr. Favini stated: 
I thank God that the victim Jeremy George was not hurt any Further 
by my behavior And or actions, and because of this behavior I owe 
Jeremy George An apology! I hope he can Find it within his heart too 
Forgive me. I also ask my mother and Father for their forgiveness in 
putting the Family through All of this madness. I'm sorry. (Sic). 
(Exhibits, p.20.) The PSI writer noted that Mr. Favini seemed sincere in his remorse. 
(Exhibits, p.3.) 
Mr. Favini's criminal history is as long as his history of mental illness (Exhibits, 
pp.4-9) and certainly could be considered by the district court when determining an 
appropriate sentence. However, Mr. Favini's sentence is simply disproportionate to the 
crime he committed especially considering the mitigating factors that exist in this case. 
Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness 
as a sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999) (citing State v. 
Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 391 (1994)). Furthermore, rehabilitation is an important factor 
which should be considered by the district court. See State v. James, 112 Idaho 239, 
243-44 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that "rehabilitation and health problems are factors to 
consider in a motion for reduction in a sentence"). The court also must consider a 
defendant's remorse and/or regret for committing the crime. See State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 595 (1982). IVlr. George testified that he received eight stitches in his hand 
as a result of Mr. Favini's actions. (Tr. p.144, Ls.4-8.) The district court sentenced 
Mr. Favini for up to more than 6 years in prison per stitch. In light of Mr. Favini's long 
history of mental illness and his desire for treatment, as well as his genuine remorse for 
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having committed the crime, his sentence of fifty years, with five years fixed (which is 
twice the total sentence recommend by the prosecutor during the jurisdictional review 
hearing), is excessive. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Favini respectfully requests that this Court remand his case for a new 
sentencing hearing, in front of a different district court, with instructions that the district 
court not consider information obtained from the competency evaluation. Alternatively, 
Mr. Favini respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence to a unified term of 
twenty-five years, with five years fixed, or otherwise as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 1 ih day of July, 2012. 
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